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The Basel II Agreement is a new stage in the development of prudential regulations. Compared to the initial 
agreement, Basel I, this one allows a more large and precise analysis of banking risks.  The European approach 
of Basel II requirements aims to offer some common conditions for all the credit institutions. Secondly, in order 
to achieve the objectives of Basel II, an active implication of the supervisory authorities is needed, as well as a 
tighter cooperation between them in order to increase the financial integration at the European Union level.  In 
what  concerns  Romania,  that  has  recently  joined  the  European  Union,  the  implementation  of  Basel  II 
requirements imply a new series of challenges both for credit institutions and for the Central Bank. These 
challenges, for the commercial banks, reside in adjusting the risk management techniques and the informational 
system,  training  the  staff,  obtaining  the  databases,  etc.    and  for  the  Central  Bank  in  both    adapting  the 
surveillance process and elaborating new regulations. This paper tries to analyze the main implications of 
implementing these requirements, both for the Romanian commercial banks and for the National Bank.  
  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
The intensification of international banking activities, as well as the development of the international financial 
markets, have changed the order established at Bretton Woods, after the World War II. These facts have also 
determined  supervision  and  regulation,  that  until  than  were  a  national  matter,  to  become  of  international 
significance. So, it was felt the need for a harmonization of the banking prudential requirements, as well as an 
intensification of the supervision.  In this way was organized the Basel Committee, which has put the basis of a 
first  international  agreement  related  to  prudential  regulation.  The  agreement  has  reached  two  important 
objectives. First, it has strengthened the stability and soundness of the international banking system, through 
establishing a minimum capital adequacy level and, second, it has removed the competitive inequity that came 
out because of the differences in national regulations. Bieri (2004) considers that the Basel process is a key 
element of the global financial system and plays an important role in coordinating the multilateral efforts of 
different committees that aim to strengthen the financial stability. 
 
Following the publication of the  first proposal for a new capital accord in June 1999, and two  subsequent 
consultative packages in 2002 and 2004, the revised framework for the “International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards”, also known as Basel II was endorsed on 26 June 2004 by the central bank 
governors and head of the banking supervisory authorities of the G10 countries. The Basel II framework is 
meant also to form the basis for the legislative changes underway in the EU. The old EU rules, dating from 1988, 
were  contained  in  the  Capital  Adequacy  Directive  (1993)  and  the  Consolidated  Banking  Directive  (2000). 
Recently, the European Parliament and the Council approved legislation transposing these rules into Community 
law and this legislation will, in turn, be transposed into national law. The European Central Bank (ECB) has an 
interest in these developments because of their possible implications for financial supervision, financial stability 
and financial integration. 
 
In Romania, the national authorities have implemented successfully the Basel I capital adequacy framework, 
with some national differences. Given the change in the international legislation, and because beginning with 
2007 Romania is a new member of the European Union (EU), the National Bank of Romania, together with 
other authorities in the financial sector, has tried to put into national laws the new capital adequacy framework, 
that is Basel II. This paper tries to point out what are the main challenges for this implementation, as well as the stage of implementation and the impact on both the banking sector and on the regulation authorities. First  it 
starts by describing the core elements of the Basel II accord, passing on to describing the implementation process 
in Romania.    
 
 
2.  BASEL II REQUIREMENTS  
 
2.1. What is the Basel II Framework?  
 
The intensification of international banking activities, as well as the development of the international financial 
markets, have changed the order established at Bretton Woods, after the World War II. These facts have also 
determined  supervision  and  regulation,  that  until  than  were  a  national  matter,  to  become  of  international 
significance. So, it was felt the need for an harmonization of the banking prudential requirements, as well as an 
intensification of the supervision.  In this way was organized the Basel Committee, which has put the basis of a 
first  international  agreement  related  to  prudential  regulation.  The  agreement  has  reached  two  important 
objectives. First, it has strengthened the stability and soundness of the international banking system, through 
establishing a minimum capital adequacy level and, second, it has removed the competitive inequity that came 
out because of the differences in national regulations. Bieri (2004) considers that the Basel process is a key 
element of the global financial system and plays an important role in coordinating the multilateral efforts of 
different committees that aim to strengthen the financial stability. 
 
The first Basel Capital Accord was instituted in 1988 to coordinate global regulatory efforts and to institute 
minimum capital requirements to eliminate the threat posed by undercapitalized banks. This agreement this 
reached two main objectives: (i) to strengthen the international financial and banking system and (ii) to eliminate 
the competitive inequalities that appeared because of the differences in national regulation. So, a new framework 
was set in what regards the banks’ capital and its adequacy. The capital adequacy ratio was set at 8%. The capital 
requirements were set relative to the total risk adjusted assets and off balance sheet items. There was prescribed a 
single measure of risk, which is the credit risk to determine minimal capital requirements. This was because the 
credit risk is one of the main risks with which the banks are confronted. – according to an opinion poll that the 
National Bank of Romania has performed in 2003, the credit risk was perceived to be a main reason for concern. 
Credit risk can be defined as a risk of consecutive losses, due to the probability of default.  
 
To deal with the growing complexity of the financial industry and with the systemic threats, a new Capital 
Accord  was  proposed  by  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision,  to  establish  a  more  sophisticated 
framework for banks to measure risk and set aside sufficient capital to cover losses from market, credit, and 
operational risk. The new rules set out by the Basel Committee; improve the ability of banks to manage risks. 
The new capital adequacy ratio represents a more complex prudential component, which allows a more detailed 
approach to banking risks.  
 
Basel II is based on three mutually reinforcing pillars: minimum capital requirements (Pillar I), the supervisory 
review process (Pillar II) and market discipline (Pillar III). A  main innovation is that a set of increasingly 
sophisticated approaches is now available to banks to calculate their minimum capital requirements. There are 
two approaches  for calculating capital requirements, a standardised approach based on external ratings (i.e. 
banks using this approach would have to risk weight according to the grids provided below) and an internal 
ratings based approach (IRB) to be used by the more sophisticated banks. Although the simplest method to 
calculate capital for credit risk is based on assessments by rating agencies, under the most advanced approaches, 
banks are allowed to use their own estimated risk parameters. Moreover, for the first time, banks are required to 
hold capital for operational risk. 
 
  
Figure 1 The structure of the Basel II Framework  
Source: Nomura Fixed Income Research 
 
 
2.2. Pillar I – minimum capital requirements 
 
In what regards the credit risk there are two approaches that can be used: the standard and the internal-ratings 
based approach.  The standardised approach is closest to the present capital rules. Exposures are classified into a 
set of standardised asset classes (see Figure 2) and a risk weight is applied to each class, reflecting the relative 
degree of credit risk. As under Basel I, off-balance sheet exposures are for capital purposes transformed into 
“assets” through the application of “credit conversion factors”. The main changes compared to Basel I relate to 
the use of external credit ratings as the basis for determining the risk weights and the greater differentiation in 
possible risk weights.  
 
Compared  to  Basel  I,  where  all  corporate  exposures  are  weighted  at  100%,  there  is  now  a  considerable 
differentiation in the risk weights. The weight for investment-grade firms has declined considerably (e.g. to 20 % 
for AAA), whereas in the non-investment grade segment, a risk weight of 150% applies to firms rated below 
“BB-”. Furthermore, unrated firms now obtain the same risk weight as that formerly obtained by all corporates 
under Basel I. For claims on banks, the former distinction between institutions from OECD (20% risk weight) 
and non-OECD countries (100%) is no longer applied. Instead, two options are available to national supervisors. 
Under the first option, the risk weights for banks are derived from the ratings of the country in which the bank is 
incorporated. Under the second option, the risk weights are determined on the basis of the bank’s own rating. 
Retail  exposures  (75%  instead  of  100%)  and  mortgage  loans  (35%  instead  of  50%)  are  treated  more 
advantageously than under Basel I. Exposures to small businesses may under certain conditions also benefit from 
the preferred retail treatment. 
 
The internal ratings-based (IRB) approach to credit risk is one of the most innovative elements of the New 
Framework because it allows banks themselves to determine certain key elements in the calculation of their 
capital  requirements.  Hence,  the  risk  weights  –  and  thus  the  capital  charges  –  are  determined  through  a 
combination of quantitative inputs provided either by banks or supervisory authorities, and risk weight functions 
specified  by  the  BCBS.  The  new  methodology  is  designed  to  be  suitable  for  implementation  by  banks  of 
different size, business structure and risk profile.  
 
Just like the standardised approach, the IRB approach distinguishes between asset classes to which different 
supervisory risk weight functions apply: 
·  Sovereign exposures 
·  Bank exposures 
·  Corporate exposures: exposures to small and medium sized enterprises, specialised lending, purchased 
receivables, other corporate exposures ·  Retail  exposures:  residential  mortgage  loans;  qualifying  revolving  retail  exposures,  purchased 
receivables, other retail 
·  Equity exposures 
 
The calculation of capital requirements for a loan’s default risk under Basel II requires four input parameters to 
the supervisory risk weight functions: 
·  Probability of default (PD): Estimate of the likelihood of the borrower defaulting on his obligations 
within one year. 
·  Loss given default (LGD): Loss on the exposure following the borrower’s default, commonly expressed 
as a percentage of the debt’s original nominal value. 
·  Exposure at default (EAD): Nominal value of the borrower’s outstanding debt. 
·  Effective maturity of the loan (M). 
 
The use of the IRB approach is subject to an explicit supervisory approval, which depends on meeting certain 
minimum requirements from the outset and on an ongoing basis. These requirements are aimed at the IRB 
system providing an adequate assessment of the bank’s exposures, a meaningful differentiation of risk and a 
reasonably good estimate of risk. In the practical implementation of the IRB system, validation of the models 
chosen by banks, i.e. the assessment of the soundness of the different system elements is a very important matter.  
 
Operational risk has so far not been subject to capital requirements. When considering moving to Basel II, 
supervisors should be aware of the impact of this risk and understand that it is designed to provide incentives for 
banks  to  develop  suitable  approaches  to  operational  risk  measurement  and  ensure  that  banks  are  holding 
sufficient  capital  for  this  important  risk.  For  the  operational  risk,  three  options  of  different  levels  of 
sophistication are introduced. First, basic indicator approach, implies that a bank’s capital requirement to cover 
operational risk is equal to 15% of its average gross annual income over the previous three years. Second, the 
standardised approach, states that a bank’s gross income (three year average) is divided into eight different 
business lines. The capital charge is then calculated for each business line by multiplying the respective gross 
income  by  a  factor  (determined  by  the  Basel  Committee)  assigned  to  that  business  line.  The  total  capital 
requirement for operational risk under this approach is the sum of the individual capital requirements of these 
eight  business  areas.  And  the  last  one,  the  advanced  measurement  approach  uses  sophisticated  calculation 
method, under which the operational risk charge is calculated on the basis of the banks’ own internal operational 
risk management systems. 
 
In what regards the choice of approach, i.e. standardized or IRB it is worth noting that in some countries low 
rating penetration and the lack of domestic rating agencies  may pose a challenge to implementation of the 
standardized approach, particularly in respect of corporate claims. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS)  states  that  if  external  ratings  are  to  be  used,  supervisors  will  need  to  evaluate  the  soundness  and 
reliability  of  the  institutions  performing  the  assessments  against  the  eligibility  criteria  set  out  in  the  new 
Framework. The regulatory infrastructure should enable supervisors to address the potential problems that may 
arise in environments when companies can inappropriately obtain good ratings. Supervisors should also discuss 
with banks hoe they intend to monitor changes in external rating or country risk scores, and how these will be 
reflected in systems for capital computation.  
 
2.3. Pillar II – supervisory framework  
 
Supervisors, including those who choose to retain the 1988 capital adequacy framework, are encouraged by the 
BCBS to move towards a system of risk-based supervision. The supervisory review process relies on four 
Principles.  
·  Banks should have a process for assessing their overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk profile 
and a strategy for maintaining capital levels. 
·  Supervisors should review and evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies, as 
well as their ability to monitor and ensure compliance with regulatory capital ratios. If they are not 
satisfied with the result of this process, supervisors should take appropriate action. 
·  Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory capital ratios and should 
have the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum. 
·  Supervisors  should  seek  to  intervene  at  an  early  stage  to  prevent  capital  from  falling  below  the 
minimum levels required to support the risk characteristics of a bank and should require rapid remedial 
action if capital is not maintained or restored. 
 The BCBS stresses that the supervisory process should contain a mixture of off-site and on-site inspection, 
periodic reporting and, discussions with senior management and board of directors. The supervisors should also 
shift their emphasis towards the quality of a bank’s risk management process and ability to assess risk exposures 
properly. It has outlined some important issues to which both banks and supervisors should devote attention in 
the supervisory review process. These issues also include risk categories which are not directly addressed under 
Pillar I, such as the credit concentration risk. 
 
2.4. Pillar III – market discipline 
 
Under Pillar III, banks will be required to publish information focused on the key parameters of their business 
profile, risk exposure and risk management. Such disclosures are seen as a precondition for the effective working 
of market discipline on banks. For banking groups, the requirements apply to the top consolidated level of the 
banking group. Both qualitative and quantitative information must be disclosed. Disclosure of a bank’s financial 
information in a timely and reliable manner fosters market discipline by permitting market participants to assess 
a bank’s activities and the risks inherent in those activities, and to react accordingly. It strengthens the incentives 
for banks to behave in a prudent manner and thereby promotes financial stability. Market discipline based on 
adequate public disclosure is an effective complement to supervisory efforts to encourage banks to maintain 
sound risk management systems and practices. Supervisors should require banks to make periodic disclosures of 
information that are timely, accurate and sufficiently comprehensive to provide a basis for effective market 
discipline.  The  reliability  of  disclosed  information  should  be  assured  by  sound  internal  control  and  risk 
management systems and complemented by effective external and internal audit. 
 
Supervisors should engage in a dialogue with banks regarding additional disclosure requirements and how they 
are to be effected. In some cases, the requisite information is captured in the bank’s risk management system and 
used as an input to capital adequacy computations. In others, the information will already be disclosed to meet 
other accounting or regulatory requirements. For disclosures that are not mandatory or required under accounting 
or other external reporting obligations, banks may provide the information in a number of ways, such as via 
publicly accessible internet websites or in public regulatory reports filed with bank supervisors. To the extent 
that it is  feasible, banks are encouraged to provide all related information in one location, or alternatively, 
indicate where the information can be found. 
 
 
3. BASEL II FRAMEWORK IN ROMANIA 
 
Basel II is being transposed into the European Union through the reconfiguration of the directives in this respect. 
These directives incorporate some differences from the Basel Committee requirements, as they appear as a result 
of negotiation between the member countries and are tailored to the specificities of the European economies. 
One of the differences is that, while the Basel II framework was addressed mainly to internationally active 
banks, the EU regulations are applied to all banks and  and investment firms, irrespective of their dimension or 
geographic  area  in  which  they  operate.  Another  difference  is  that  Basel  II  applies  at  consolidated  and  sub 
consolidated level, while the European directives apply at both the individual and consolidated level. 
 
In what regards Romania, due to its recent accession to the EU in 2007 and, because of the large number of 
banks part of an international group, alongside with the diversification of the banking operations, it also has to 
adhere to the international regulations and transpose the Basel Ii requirements into national legislation. 
 
In Romania, the implementation of  the  new capital accord, poses a series of challenges both on the credit 
institutions and on the National Bank of Romania (NBR).  The objectives of the NBR, regarding Basel II, consist 
of three main directions: 
·  The transposal of the new requirements into the national legislation 
·  The development of means of prudential supervision, adequate to the new context 
·  The development of risk management systems at the credit institution’s level 
 
The NBR’s strategy for the implementation of the New Capital Accord consists of three phases. 
 
Phase  I  –  Initiating  the  dialogue  and  achieving  the  exchange  of  information  with  the  banking  sector.  The 
principal activities are: 
a.  Achieving  a  general  evaluation  regarding  the  risk  management  tools  and  knowing  the  credit 
institutions position regarding the national options (standard approach or internal models based 
approach) b.  Establishing the dialogue  and exchanging information with national authorities (Ministry of Public 
Finance, National Commission of Securities) and international ones (supervision authorities from 
other states) 
c.  Evaluation of requirements for training for the banking sector and the central authority.  
Phase  II  –  Development  of  instruments  for  achieving  the  banking  supervision  in  conformity  with  the  New 
Capital Accord standards. In this phase, the efforts will be focused on the following domains: 
·  transposing the European Directives in the national legal frame ; 
·  performing  supervision  activities  from  the  central  bank  headquarters  and  missions  to  the  credit 
institutions to verify the preparation stage for implementing Basel II; 
·  ensuring the premises for financial stability when the New Accord will be applied. 
Phase III – Process of validation by the National Bank of internal rating models used by the credit institutions for 
customers evaluation and of existent credits portfolio. 
Phase IV – Verifying how the New Capital Accord is applied in the banking sector.  
 
For the implementation of the New Capital accord, the following measures must be taken: 
·  Regarding  the  legal  frame  –  the  two  European  Directives  must  be  transposed  in  the  Romanian 
legislation.  
·  Regarding the institutional frame, the central bank has to train the personnel, develop the databases 
regarding the credits, to auto evaluate the supervision capacity (pillar 2), to evaluate of the impact of 
macroeconomic evolutions on the financial stability. In the same time, the credit institutions have to 
include the Basel II requirements in the internal  strategies and politics,  to develop the corporative 
governance practices, to reconfigure the objectives for the customers’ relationship and the banking 
products.   
·  The relationship frame is a very important one and consists in: collaboration between the National 
Bank,  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  the  Romanian  Banking  Association,  the  National  Commission  for 
Securities; cooperation accords  with the supervision authorities from the origin  states of the credit 
institutions  having  branches  in  Romania,  enforcing  collaboration  at  regional  level  regarding  the 
experience in Basel II implementation, Development of the rating national agencies.    
The  Steering  Committee  is  the  main  decision-making  body  for  implementing  Basel  II  and  encompasses 
representatives  of  the  National  Bank  of  Romania  (NBR),  the  National  Securities  Commission  (NSC),  the 
Ministry of Public Finance, and the Romanian Banking Association (RBA). 
 
3.1. Legal framework 
 
A  question  to  be  asked  when  trying  to  assess  the  implementation  of  Basel  II  requirements,  is  whether  the 
framework is sufficiently robust to assure the effectiveness of credit risk mitigation techniques (e.g. what are the 
standards for loan security, security registration and foreclosure).  
 
In Romania, the regulatory framework has been substantially reconfigured. The banking laws will have to be 
revised, in order to meet the Basel II criteria. The NBR has done some work in this respect. For the banking 
sector and the capital market the year 2006, was dominated by the transposure of the European legislation that 
ensure the implementation of the Basel II standards into the national legislation. The process of transposing the 
EC 2006/49 Directive, with respect to the adequacy of the investment firms and credit institutions’ capital level, 
was  of  great  significance.  This  exercise  has  joined  the  forces  of  the  national  competent  authorities  in  the 
financial sector, such as the NBR and the NSC, the Ministry of Finance and the banking community and was 
finalized through the publication of the Government Emergency Ordinance (GEO) 99/2006 concerning credit 
institutions and capital adequacy. This regulation, accomplished through the application of the EC directive, for 
both  credit  institutions  and  financial  investment  institutions,  has  the  advantage  that  it  integrates  the  legal 
dispositions regarding all kinds of credit institutions, i.e. banks, mortgage banks, savings banks, which before 
were regulated separately.  
 
In addition to the primary legislation, in the same period there were several secondary regulations published, 
with the aim to solution the transposure of the technical aspects stipulated by the EC. This approach insures a 
unitary  treatment  for  the  legal  provisions  applicable  both  to  credit  institutions  and  financial  investment 
institutions. Table 1 best shows the laws and regulations that were modified and made compatible with the Basel 
II regulations.  
 
The new capital adequacy  framework became effective beginning  with 1
st of January 2007. The new legal 
context,  together  with  the  Romania’s  EU  membership,  favours  the  presence  of  some  EU  implementation 
particularities, of the capital standards applicable to credit institutions and investment firms.   Table 1 
Transposure of EC directives into national regarding the capital requirements 
 
 
ROMANIA     Provisions within 
Dir.2006/48/EC  National texts 
L L: :G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   E Em me er rg ge en nc cy y   O Or rd di in na an nc ce e   N No o. .9 99 9/ /2 20 00 06 6      
o on n   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a ad de eq qu ua ac cy y      ( (I I) )    I. Own Funds   Art.56 to 67  
R R: :R Re eg gu ul la at ti io on n   N NB BR R- -   N NS SC C   N No o. .1 18 8/ /2 23 3/ /2 20 00 06 6   r re eg ga ar rd di in ng g   o ow wn n   f fu un nd ds s   o of f   c cr re ed di it t   
i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   i in nv ve es st tm me en nt t   f fi ir rm ms s      ( (I I) )   
L L: :G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   E Em me er rg ge en nc cy y   O Or rd di in na an nc ce e   N No o. .9 99 9/ /2 20 00 06 6      
o on n   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a ad de eq qu ua ac cy y   ( (I I) )   
II. Scope   Art.68 to 73  
R R: :R Re eg gu ul la at ti io on n   N NB BR R- -   N NS SC C   N No o. .1 17 7/ /2 22 2/ // /2 20 00 06 6   r re eg ga ar rd di in ng g   t th he e   c co on ns so ol li id de ed d   
s su up pe er rv vi is si io on n   o of f   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   i in nv ve es st tm me en nt t   f fi ir rm ms s      ( (I I) )   
L L: :G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   E Em me er rg ge en nc cy y   O Or rd di in na an nc ce e   N No o. .9 99 9/ /2 20 00 06 6   o on n   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   
a an nd d   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a ad de eq qu ua ac cy y      ( (I I) )    III. Calculation of minimum level of 
own funds   Art.74 to 75   R:Regulation NBR- NSC No.13/18/2006concerning the determination of 
minimum capital requirements for credit institutions and investment firms   
L L: :G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   E Em me er rg ge en nc cy y   O Or rd di in na an nc ce e   N No o. .9 99 9/ /2 20 00 06 6      
o on n   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a ad de eq qu ua ac cy y      ( (I I) )   
IV. Standardised approach   Art.78 to 83 and 
Annex VI   R R: :R Re eg gu ul la at ti io on n   N NB BR R- -   N NS SC C   N No o. .1 14 4/ /1 19 9/ // /2 20 00 06 6   o on n   c cr re ed di it t   r ri is sk k   t tr re ea at tm me en nt t   u us si in ng g   t th he e   
s st ta an nd da ar rd di is se ed d   a ap pp pr ro oa ac ch h, ,   f fo or r   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   i in nv ve es st tm me en nt t   f fi ir rm ms s      ( (I I) )   
L L: :G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   E Em me er rg ge en nc cy y   O Or rd di in na an nc ce e   N No o. .9 99 9/ /2 20 00 06 6      
o on n   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a ad de eq qu ua ac cy y      ( (I I) )   
V. IRB   Art.84 to 89 and 
Annex VII   R R: :R Re eg gu ul la at ti io on n   N NB BR R- -   N NS SC C   N No o. .1 15 5/ /2 20 0/ /2 20 00 06 6   o on n   c cr re ed di it t   r ri is sk k   t tr re ea at tm me en nt t   u us si in ng g   t th he e   
i in nt te er rn na al l   m mo od de el ls s   b ba as se ed d   a ap pp pr ro oa ac ch h, ,   f fo or r   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   i in nv ve es st tm me en nt t   f fi ir rm ms s         
L L: :G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   E Em me er rg ge en nc cy y   O Or rd di in na an nc ce e   N No o. .9 99 9/ /2 20 00 06 6      
o on n   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a ad de eq qu ua ac cy y      ( (I I) )   
VI. CRM (credit risc mitigation)   Art. 90 to 93 and 
Annex VIII   R R: :   R Re eg gu ul la at ti io on n   N NB BR R- -   N NS SC C   N No o. .1 19 9/ /2 24 4/ /2 20 00 06 6   o on n   c cr re ed di it t   r ri is sk k   m mi it ti ig ga at ti io on n   
t te ec ch hn ni iq qu ue es s   u us se ed d   b by y   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on n   a an nd d   i in nv ve es st tm me en nt t   f fi ir rm ms s      ( (I I) )   
L L: :G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   E Em me er rg ge en nc cy y   O Or rd di in na an nc ce e   N No o. .9 99 9/ /2 20 00 06 6      
o on n   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a ad de eq qu ua ac cy y   ( (I I) )   
VII. Securitisation   Art.94 to 101 and 
Annex IX   R R: :   R Re eg gu ul la at ti io on n   N NB BR R- -   N NS SC C   N No o. .2 21 1/ /2 26 6/ /2 20 00 06 6   o on n   c cr re ed di it t   r ri is sk k   t tr re ea at tm me en nt t   
r re eg ga ar rd di in ng g   s se ec cu ur ri it ti iz ze ed d   e ex xp po os su ur re es s   a an nd d   s se ec cu ur ri it ti is sa at ti io on n   p po os si it ti io on ns s   ( (I I) )   
L L: :G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   E Em me er rg ge en nc cy y   O Or rd di in na an nc ce e   N No o. .9 99 9/ /2 20 00 06 6      
o on n   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a ad de eq qu ua ac cy y      ( (I I) )   
VIII. Operational risk   Art.102 to 105 and 
Annex X   R R: :   R Re eg gu ul la at ti io on n   N NB BR R- -   N NS SC C   N No o. .2 24 4/ /2 29 9/ /2 20 00 06 6   r re eg ga ar rd di in ng g   t th he e   c ca al lc cu ul la at ti io on n   o of f   t th he e   
m mi in ni im mu um m   c ca ap pi it ta al l   r re eq qu ui ir re em me en nt ts s   f fo or r   o op pe er ra at ti io on na al l   r ri is sk k   o of f   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   
i in nv ve es st tm me en nt t   f fi ir rm ms s   ( (I I) )   
L L: :G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   E Em me er rg ge en nc cy y   O Or rd di in na an nc ce e   N No o. .9 99 9/ /2 20 00 06 6      
o on n   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a ad de eq qu ua ac cy y      ( (I I) )   
IX. Large exposures   Art.106 to 119  
R R: :   R Re eg gu ul la at ti io on n   N NB BR R- -   N NS SC C   N No o. .1 16 6/ /2 21 1/ /2 20 00 06 6   r re eg ga ar rd di in ng g   l la ar rg ge e   e ex xp po os su ur re es s   o of f   
   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   i in nv ve es st tm me en nt t   f fi ir rm ms s      ( (I I) )   
L L: :G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   E Em me er rg ge en nc cy y   O Or rd di in na an nc ce e   N No o. .9 99 9/ /2 20 00 06 6      
o on n   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a ad de eq qu ua ac cy y      ( (I I) )   
X. Pillar II   Art.123, 124, 136 
and Annex XI   R R: :   R Re eg gu ul la at ti io on n   N NB BR R- -   N NS SC C   N No o. .2 23 3/ /2 28 8/ /2 20 00 06 6   o on n   t te ec ch hn ni ic ca al l   c cr ri it te er ri ia a   c co on nc ce er rn ni in ng g   
t th he e   o or rg ga an ni is sa at ti io on n   a an nd d   t tr re ea at tm mn ne et t   o of f   r ri is sk ks s, ,   a as s   w we el ll l   a as s   t te ec ch hn ni ic ca al l   c cr ri it te er ri ia a   o on n   
r re ev vi ie ew w   a an nd d   e ev va al lu ua at ti io on n   b by y   t th he e   c co om mp pe et te en nt t   a au ut th ho or ri it ti ie es s   ( (I I) )   
XI. Supervision and cooperation   Art.129 to 132  
L L: :G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   E Em me er rg ge en nc cy y   O Or rd di in na an nc ce e   N No o. .9 99 9/ /2 20 00 06 6      
o on n   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a ad de eq qu ua ac cy y      ( (I I) )   
L L: :G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   E Em me er rg ge en nc cy y   O Or rd di in na an nc ce e   N No o. .9 99 9/ /2 20 00 06 6      
o on n   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a ad de eq qu ua ac cy y      ( (I I) )   
XII. Disclosure by credit institutions   Art.145 to 149 and 
Annex XII   R R: :   R Re eg gu ul la at ti io on n   N NB BR R- -   N NS SC C   N No o. .2 25 5/ /3 30 0/ /2 20 00 06 6   r re eg ga ar rd di in ng g   t th he e   d di is sc cl lo os su ur re e   
r re eq qu ui ir re em me en nt ts s   f fo or r   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   i in nv ve es st tm me en nt t   f fi ir rm ms s      ( (I I) )   
L L: :G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   E Em me er rg ge en nc cy y   O Or rd di in na an nc ce e   N No o. .9 99 9/ /2 20 00 06 6      
o on n   c cr re ed di it t   i in ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   a an nd d   c ca ap pi it ta al l   a ad de eq qu ua ac cy y      ( (I I) )   
XIII. Internal governance  Art. 22 and Annex 
V  R R: :   R Re eg gu ul la at ti io on n   N NB BR R- -   N NS SC C   N No o. .2 23 3/ /2 28 8/ /2 20 00 06 6   o on n   t te ec ch hn ni ic ca al l   c cr ri it te er ri ia a   c co on nc ce er rn ni in ng g   
t th he e   o or rg ga an ni iz za at ti io on n   a an nd d   t tr re ea at tm me en nt t   o of f   r ri is sk ks s, ,   a as s   w we el ll l   a as s   t te ec ch hn ni ic ca al l   c cr ri it te er ri ia a   o on n   
r re ev vi ie ew w   a an nd d   e ev va al lu ua at ti io on n   b by y   t th he e   c co om mp pe et te en nt t   a au ut th ho or ri it ti ie es s      ( (I I) )   
XIV. Counterparty Credit Risk   Annex III 
R R: :   R Re eg gu ul la at ti io on n   N NB BR R- -   N NS SC C   N No o. .2 20 0/ /2 25 5/ /2 20 00 06 6   o on n   t th he e   t tr re ea at tm me en nt t   o of f   c co ou un nt te er rp pa ar rt ty y   
c cr re ed di it t   r ri is sk k   o of f   d de er ri iv va at ti iv ve e   i in ns st tr ru um me en nt ts s, ,   r re ep pu ur rc ch ha as se e   t tr ra an ns sa ac ct ti io on ns s, ,   s se ec cu ur ri it ti ie es s   o or r   
c co om mm mo od di it ti ie es s   l le en nd di in ng g   o or r   b bo or rr ro ow wi in ng g   t tr ra an ns sa ac ct ti io on ns s, ,   l lo on ng g   s se et tt tl le em me en nt t   
t tr ra an ns sa ac ct ti io on ns s   a an nd d   m ma ar rg gi in n   l le en nd di in ng g   t tr ra an ns sa ac ct ti io on ns s      ( (I I) )   
* L-texts of laws; R-texts of regulations; A-administrative rules; applicable to credit intitutions-CI, investment firms-IF; I-applicable to both 
Source: National Bank of Romania 3.2. The Supervisory framework 
 
The  new  policy  issues  and  banking  supervision  approaches  have  changed  substantially  the  supervisory 
methodology, from a compliance-based approach to a risk-based assessment.  The National Bank of Romania 
conducts supervision of credit institutions, Romanian legal persons, at both individual and consolidated levels, in 
case of competent authority designation and develops the necessary techniques for credit institutions supervision 
at individual level. It also concludes cooperation agreements with other authorities in Member States and other 
countries, in order to ensure: 
·  financial stability 
·  flexibility in adapting the ever changing cooperation framework 
·  uniform  implementation  of  principles  of  Basel  II  Accord  (especially  in  terms  of  risk  management 
centralization at group level, outsourcing principles at group level) 
 
At subsidiaries level, Romanian legal entities, the NBR allows group policies implementation in terms of risk 
management and individual capital requirements determination.  
 
One key challenge for supervisors is enhancing the quality of supervision through a greater involvement of credit 
institutions’ management in risk management, credit institutions’ assessment focusing on their risk profile and 
consolidated supervision based on close cross-border cooperation, both between consolidating credit institutions 
and their corresponding supervisory authorities.  
 
The  NBR  sets  and  discloses  the  general  criteria  and  methodologies  for  risk  strategies  and  profiles,  risk 
management framework and internal control mechanisms, which should be enforced by credit institutions for 
prudential reasons, as well as for risk assessment. In order to establish the mentioned criteria and methodologies, 
NBR is complying with the following principles: (i) to meet convergence criteria in supervisory practices at 
Romanian  supervisory  authorities  level  and  (ii)  to  ensure  a  sole  risk  supervisory  approach  for  competent 
supervisory authorities.  
 
New instruments have been set out for banking supervision under Basel II Accord, like Common Reporting 
(COREP), Financial Reporting (FINREP), prudential filters, benchmarks set by the supervisory authority needed 
for assessing banks’ risk parameters in internal models.  
 
The main changes in the new prudential supervision approach have been consisted by reducing the compliance 
supervision and enforcing a risk-based prudential supervision, focusing more on meeting corporate governance 
principles,  assessment  of  the  stability,  soundness  and  efficiency  of  the  risk  management  process  of  credit 
institutions, especially with regard to improving the quality of risk management strategy, setting-up and efficient 
functioning  of  specialized  committees  and  management  supporting  committees,  efficient  functioning  of  an 
adequate internal control system and a sound and transparent management information system.  
 
3.3. Capital adequacy, the credit risk, and market risk in the romanian banking sector 
 
In 2006, the Romanian banking system remains adequately capitalized, although solvency indicators continued 
to decline on the back of non-government loans expansion. Furthermore, the stress test results, carried out by the 
NBR point out that the Romanian banking system is able to resist to some severe exogenous shocks. 
 
Solvency ratio of total credit institutions stayed on the downward trend it had followed since 2001 and dropped 
3.73 percentage points. However, its level of 17.34 percent recorded in December 2006 indicated the adequate 
capitalization of credit institutions, as it was higher than the level reported by the Euro zone (11.2 percent at mid-
2006). So, it can be said that, although declining the solvency ratio is still higher than the one required by the 
Romanian legislation (12%). 
  
Figure 2. Solvency ratio by group of banks ( 2000-2006) 
Source: NBR, Financial Stability Report 2007 
  
Small banks show the tendency to record solvency ratios close to those calculated for medium sized banks, as a 
result of the increasingly active involvement in the lending activity. It is noteworthy that this development 
occurred amid the higher credit market concentration, with the market share of the top-five banks in total credit 
going up. As regards bank distribution in terms of solvency ratio, 2006 marked the continuation of banks’ 
tendency  to  migrate  towards  lower  capital  adequacy  levels,  amid  the  persistently  high  growth  rate  of  non-
government loans. (NBR, 2007) 
 
Credit risk is still the main risk Romanian banks have to cope with. In the short run, the NBR expects credit risk 
to increase, accompanied by fast-paced lending and advancement into the economic cycle.  
Market risk across the Romanian banking system continues to be generally low. There are no signs indicating 
severe systemic implications arising from the market risk. As concerns the market risk category, the interest rate 
risk remains the main source of vulnerability facing the Romanian banking system. The direct exposure of credit 
institutions to the change in the interest rate, although on a slight increase, remains moderate, whereas direct 
exposures to the change in the exchange rate and the change in the share price are further less significant. 
Nevertheless, indirectly, the risk passes through to the loan portfolio quality 
 
3.4. Specific features relating to the banking sector 
 
For the provisions of the European Directive to be implemented, the Steering Committee adopted the method of 
exercising national discretions (specifications leaving to national discretion the manner of implementing some of 
the EU provisions). Options are circumscribed particularly to (credit, operational, and market) risks, own funds 
and supervision on a consolidated and unconsolidated level. The National Bank of Romania chose to take a 
prudent approach to national options.  
 
Table  2  shows  key  changes  to  risk  weights,  as  they  result  from  exercising  national  discretions  for  the 
standardized approach. The key change will affect mostly retail exposures (individuals and SMEs treated as 
retail) and residential mortgage exposures. A simplified estimation reveals a reduction of nearly 16 percent in 
risk weighted assets (balance sheet exposures) in the case of retail-sector and corporate loans, which will lead to 
an increase in credit institutions’ solvency. Last but not least, lending to regional and local governments could 
become more expensive under the new framework, although the financing requirements of such entities will 
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Source: NBR – Financial Stability Report, 2006 
 
The structure of the banking system is much diversified. In the 2003 Financial Stability Assessment Report from 
the IMF it is stated that the Romanian banking system rather small compared to the economy’s dimensions, but 
still holds more than 90% of the financial system’s assets. 
 
The Romanian banking sector is dominated by private foreign capital, which has (i) eased the access to foreign 
financing, (ii) led to an increased efficiency in risk management and overall and (iii) positively influenced the 
banking sector’s stability. We can also notice that the assets of the banks with majority foreign capital in the total 
assets of the system has increased very much from 1999(47.5%) to 2006 (88.6%). The greatest increase was seen 
in 2006, of about 26.4%, compared to 2005. During the year 2006 there have occurred major changes in the 
shareholder  structure,  at  the  banking  level,a  large  amount  of  foreign  capital  having  entered  the  Romanian 
banking market, much of it coming from important international credit institutions. As a consequence the share 
that  the  domestic  banks  owned  has  significantly  been  reduced.  The  increased  competition  may  lead  to  a 
reorientation from the small and medium sized banks in what concerns improvement of their financing capacity.  
This evolution stresses out the need for the harmonization of the national  
 
For 2007, most banks decided not to apply the new regulations. For next year, there are signs that banks will 
largely take the standardized approach. Some of the domestic banks, particularly those belonging to European 
bank groups, expressed their intention of adopting as fast as possible the domestic models on determining capital 
requirements  as  a  result  of  the  need  to  take  a  unitary  approach  to  risk  management,  at  group  level.  Such 
developments are indicative of the fact that in 2007 both risk management processes and supervision practices 
have stayed to the provisions of Basel I. The explanation for the sluggish pace of switching to the new model lies 
with banks’ weak interest, owing to the related costs that would reduce their profits and the overall banking 
context rife with excess liquidity which, even though requiring additional costs, prevents market players from 
seeking alternative resources. 
Table 3 
The approach indicated by credit institutions in Romania to be used starting 2007 for the calculation 





Source: NBR – Financial Stability Report, 2006 A study conducted by Ernst &Young together with The Economist magazine, on 300 European banks, among 
which 3 were Romanian, has concluded that the average cost for the implementation of Basel II IRB is at about 
70 million dollars. For the smaller banks, which choose the standardized approach these costs may drop to under 
50 million. The cost problem is very complicated, as it requires continuous investments in new technology, as 
well as training staff for using the new risk management techniques.  One might think that this would be easier 
for the large international groups, but for them the problem is that they need to adapt to the local environment. 
What might work for one country does not necessary provide the same results in others. They have discovered 
that the strategy of the west European groups holding banks in Romania is to transpose the procedures just as 
they are. This is rather unrealistic, because of the national diversity and because even history has proven this to 
be wrong.  
 
The banks are trying to find the best methods to calculate the cost for each contracted loan. The ones that are part 
of an international holding can borrow the methods from the mother bank, while the Romanian institutions must 
hire independent consultants. The implementation of the new capital framework generates high financial, human 
and time costs, which depend on the approach chosen.  
 
Some annalists say argue that the new laws would select the potential credit borrowers more rigorously. This is 
of benefit for the reduction of the credit risk, i.e. exactly what Basel II is trying to reach, but, like any other 
regulation that restricts the banks activity with capital regulations, it limits the possibility for the bank to raise 
profits from the lending activity. 
 
For a credit institution to be able to use another approach rather than the standardized approach in determining 
capital requirements, its internal models must be validated by the supervisory authority. The National Bank of 
Romania is drafting validation guides for each type of risk included in Pillar I, i.e. credit risk, market risk, and 
operational risk. The validation process hinges on the following principles: (i) primary responsibility during the 
validation process lies with the credit institutions, as the supervisor only assesses the manner in which the bank 
performed its own validation; (ii) validation basically constitutes an assessment of the predictability of a bank’s 
risk estimates; and (iii) validation is a recurrent process which takes account of both quantitative and qualitative 
aspects 
 
For the Romanian banking system, validation could be more difficult to implement from the perspective of the 
rating process and the rating system itself. As said before even though the model was designed by the parent 
undertaking and validated by the home supervisory authority, the local management must be able to prove that 
the model captures accurately the features of risks prevailing on the Romanian banking market. The model could 
well be reliable within the group, yet it may fail to capture the minor risks at aggregate level, which are relevant 
for Romania. Local management should not be a mere operator using an internal model as a black box but must 
know it satisfactorily. In fact, the management should have full control over the risks to which the entity it runs 
will be exposed. 
 
Feeding models with databases is yet another challenge.  Banks may need to implement substantial changes to 
their  internal  systems  to  prepare  for  appropriate  data  collection  and  revised  reporting  requirements.  These 
changes  may  require  systems  integration,  modification  and  new  software.  Banks  will  need  to  review  the 
necessary  system  changes  and  develop  a  realistic  implementation  timetable  to  carry  out  such  changes. 
Supervisors  must encourage  banks  to consider their data  needs very seriously and to comprehend  fully the 
techniques they will need to use to derive appropriate estimates of risk based on those data. In practical terms, 
banks will be expected to have in place – or be actively developing - a data “warehouse”, that is, a process that 
enables a bank to collect, store and draw upon loss statistics in an efficient manner over time. Data availability 
varies across portfolios, banks, jurisdictions and risk types. Supervisors may also wish to encourage private 
initiatives/processes for credit information sharing and for assessing comparability of pooled data with internal 
bank experience. Sharing of data is particularly useful when banks in a jurisdiction have a short data history. In 
these  situations,  supervisors  and  banks  will  have  to  deal  with  confidentiality  considerations.  Banks  and 
supervisors may also draw upon collaborative supervisory efforts to facilitate data collection.  At present, in 
Romania, there is no long-lasting track record for databases needed in quantifying capital requirements. Such 
imported  databases  must  prove  their  capability  of  capturing  the  structure  and  the  dynamics  of  risks  to  the 
Romanian banking market.  
 
As a rule, the approval of an internal model to assess credit risk calls for the use of the rating system for at least 
three years. The National Bank of Romania exercised its option of reducing this period to at least one year 
provided that the credit institution chooses to implement the basic internal models by 31 December 2009 or to at 
least two years if the advanced approach is introduced by 31 December 2008. (NBR, 2006) 4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The first Basel Capital Accord was instituted in 1988 to coordinate global regulatory efforts and to institute 
minimum capital requirements to eliminate the threat posed by undercapitalized banks. This agreement thas 
reached two main objectives: (i) to strengthen the international financial and banking system and (ii) to eliminate 
the competitive inequalities that appeared because of the differences in national regulation. To deal with the 
growing complexity of the financial industry and with the systemic threats, a new Capital Accord was proposed 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, to establish a more sophisticated framework for banks to 
measure risk and set aside sufficient capital to cover losses from market, credit, and operational risk. The new 
capital adequacy ratio represents a more complex prudential component, which allows a more detailed approach 
to banking risks.  
 
Following the adoption by the Basel Committee of new capital rules for banks, a process is now taking place in 
Romania to transpose the rules into national legislation. This paper gives an overview of the main issues that 
relate to the implementation. Alongside with the changes that have to be done in legislation, the NBR also needs 
to  revise  its  supervisory  framework,  by  changing  the  supervisory  methodology,  from  a  compliance-based 
approach to a risk-based assessment.  One key challenge is enhancing the quality of supervision through a 
greater  involvement  of  credit  institutions’  management  in  risk  management,  credit  institutions’  assessment 
focusing  on  their  risk  profile  and  consolidated  supervision  based  on  close  cross-border  cooperation,  both 
between consolidating credit institutions and their corresponding supervisory authorities.  
 
The implementation of the Basel requirements poses a few challenges both on the commercial banks and on the 
National Bank.  Legislative modifications have been introduced to account for the specific legal and institutional 
setting, as well as for some features of the Romanian financial system. The objectives of the NBR, in what 
regards  Basel  II,  consist  of  three  main  directions:  the  transpose  of  the  new  requirements  into  the  national 
legislation,  the  development  of  means  of  prudential  supervision,  adequate  to  the  new  context  and  the 
development of risk management systems at the credit institution’s level.  
 
 
Having the right personnel will be critical to the successful implementation of Basel II. This may involve hiring 
more  qualified  staff  and  enhancing  training  programmes.  In  particular,  for  implementing  the  advanced 
approaches for Basel II, there is a need to retain both bank and supervisory personnel with the quantitative 
expertise and skills to understand banks’ rating systems, models and capital assessment strategies in advance of 
Basel II implementation. Even for the simpler approaches, both bank and supervisory staff may need to upgrade 
their skills in the areas of credit risk mitigation and operational risk as well as capital adequacy assessment under 
Pillar 2. This raises new costs for both the NBR and the commercial banks. 
 
Banks can choose from two approaches in order to calculate the capital requirements, which are the standardized 
approach, based on external ratings and the internal-rating approach. The costs of implementation show to be 
higher for the latter, which would means that it could be quite difficult for the small and medium-sized banks to 
undertake this approach. But even for the large banks, with international activities, and part of an international 
group, this can be a little difficult, as they cannot just take the framework from the mother bank, which has 
already developed it. This is because of the specificities of each national financial system.  
 
For 2007, most banks decided not to apply the new regulations. For next year, there are signs that banks will 
largely take the standardized approach. The explanation for the slow pace of switching to the new model lies 
with banks’ weak interest, owing to the related costs that would reduce their profits and the overall banking 
context rife with excess liquidity which, even though requiring additional costs, prevents market players from 
seeking alternative resources. 
 
Feeding models with databases is yet another challenge.  Banks may need to implement substantial changes to 
their  internal  systems  to  prepare  for  appropriate  data  collection  and  revised  reporting  requirements.  These 
changes may require systems integration, modification and new software. This also affects banks in matter of 
costs.  
 
But, no matter how difficult it is, or how big the costs are for the implementation of the Basel II framework, this 
just a new step in the international regulatory environment, step that has to be done by everyone irrespective of 
the costs involved, mainly due to the fact that the financial system is moving forward at a very quick pace. The 
new products and the new operations that the commercial banks get involved with, along with the continuous 
development of the financial market, poses higher risks on banks. Hence the banks need to have well developed techniques to assess the risks, so that they do not affect the soundness of the bank. Why this is important? It is 
important because of the great importance that the financial sector plays in the economy. Threats to financial 
sector stability are also threats to the whole economy and can easily start crises that can propagate from the 
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